The Bad Other:
Introducing a New Concept of Moral Othering
*last updated on December 7, 2025
Summary
The concept of the “other” traditionally refers to marginalized groups who have been stereotyped and excluded. This essay introduces a new category: the “bad other,” the figure whose behavior is judged as dangerous or immoral and who is therefore denied empathy and complexity. Recognizing this category exposes a double standard in how othering is discussed and opens new possibilities for understanding conflict, judgment, and human behavior.
Summary
The concept of the “other” traditionally refers to marginalized groups who have been stereotyped and excluded. This essay introduces a new category: the “bad other,” the figure whose behavior is judged as dangerous or immoral and who is therefore denied empathy and complexity. Recognizing this category exposes a double standard in how othering is discussed and opens new possibilities for understanding conflict, judgment, and human behavior.
1. What “Othering” Usually Means
In the social sciences and in critical theory, the word “other” is used to describe how people or groups are seen as fundamentally different from “us.” The philosophical roots of this idea go back to authors such as Hegel, who wrote about how identity forms through encounters with another consciousness, and to Levinas, who described the ethical demand that appears when we meet another person. The modern term “othering,” however, developed later. It became common in fields such as postcolonial studies, feminist theory, and critical race theory to describe the social processes through which some groups are marked as different in ways that support unequal treatment.
In this modern scholarship, “othering” usually refers to a harmful dynamic. A dominant group defines another group as inferior, less capable, or less than fully human. This often happens along lines such as race, gender, class, ethnicity, religion, disability, or sexuality. The focus is on how these groups are pushed to the margins and how stereotypes make it easy to overlook their experiences and needs.
Because of this history, the term “othering” carries a moral warning. It signals a practice that should be recognized and challenged. Scholars and educators often encourage people to notice when they are othering someone and to try to imagine their perspective instead. The basic idea is that acknowledging the humanity of those who have been stereotyped or mistreated is an essential step toward more just relationships.
2. A Gap in How We Use This Concept
There is an assumption built into this way of thinking: in most critical and social-theoretical discussions, the “other” is usually someone vulnerable. This figure is understood as a target of stereotypes or exclusion—someone whose suffering calls for empathy and whose experiences have been overlooked. Because of this focus, the concept of “othering” is normally tied to groups that have historically been marginalized.
But this focus has left less room for examining another form of othering, one that does not fit easily into this moral frame. People also other those they see as morally bad, dangerous, or beyond redemption. These individuals are rarely described as vulnerable. Instead, they are framed as threats—harmful actors who should be punished, excluded, or dismissed.
This dynamic is well known in many areas of research, but under different names. Scholars in fields such as moral psychology, criminology, and dehumanization studies have shown how societies withdraw empathy from people labeled “offenders,” “extremists,” or “wrongdoers.” These discussions describe how moral judgment can turn people into outsiders whose motives are flattened and whose humanity is ignored. Yet these fields generally do not use the word “othering” for this process. As a result, this moralized form of distancing is not usually recognized within the frameworks that focus on marginalized groups.
This absence raises an important question: Why is othering explicitly recognized as harmful only when it targets certain kinds of people?
3. Introducing the Idea of the “Bad Other”
To describe this missing category, we can use the term the “bad other.” It refers to people who are treated as fundamentally different not because they are marginalized, but because they are seen as morally wrong.
Examples include:
The process is similar to classic othering:
4. Why This Matters
In much of the scholarship that examines othering, empathy toward the marginalized other is seen as not only possible but necessary. The idea is that if we learn to see the humanity of those who have been pushed aside, we can begin to correct some of the damage created by social hierarchies.
But when people are labeled “bad,” empathy is often actively discouraged. In many conversations—public and private—trying to understand the behavior of someone seen as harmful is interpreted as excusing that behavior. This creates a sharp divide:
Marginalized other > empathy, context, complexity
Bad other > moral judgment, distance, exclusion
This double standard has several consequences:
5. Positioning the Concept within Existing Thinking
Several fields address parts of this dynamic, but none fully capture it.
The concept of the “bad other” helps connect these areas. It shows that the same mental patterns used to dehumanize marginalized groups also shape how societies respond to people whose behavior is judged harshly. Naming this pattern creates space to examine it, question it, and understand its effects.
6. What the New Concept Makes Possible
Recognizing the “bad other” does not mean denying harm or ignoring responsibility. It does not require treating all actions as equal or refusing to make moral judgments. Rather, it suggests that even when we judge behavior, we should be aware of the mental process behind the judgment.
Naming this form of othering allows us to:
In the social sciences and in critical theory, the word “other” is used to describe how people or groups are seen as fundamentally different from “us.” The philosophical roots of this idea go back to authors such as Hegel, who wrote about how identity forms through encounters with another consciousness, and to Levinas, who described the ethical demand that appears when we meet another person. The modern term “othering,” however, developed later. It became common in fields such as postcolonial studies, feminist theory, and critical race theory to describe the social processes through which some groups are marked as different in ways that support unequal treatment.
In this modern scholarship, “othering” usually refers to a harmful dynamic. A dominant group defines another group as inferior, less capable, or less than fully human. This often happens along lines such as race, gender, class, ethnicity, religion, disability, or sexuality. The focus is on how these groups are pushed to the margins and how stereotypes make it easy to overlook their experiences and needs.
Because of this history, the term “othering” carries a moral warning. It signals a practice that should be recognized and challenged. Scholars and educators often encourage people to notice when they are othering someone and to try to imagine their perspective instead. The basic idea is that acknowledging the humanity of those who have been stereotyped or mistreated is an essential step toward more just relationships.
2. A Gap in How We Use This Concept
There is an assumption built into this way of thinking: in most critical and social-theoretical discussions, the “other” is usually someone vulnerable. This figure is understood as a target of stereotypes or exclusion—someone whose suffering calls for empathy and whose experiences have been overlooked. Because of this focus, the concept of “othering” is normally tied to groups that have historically been marginalized.
But this focus has left less room for examining another form of othering, one that does not fit easily into this moral frame. People also other those they see as morally bad, dangerous, or beyond redemption. These individuals are rarely described as vulnerable. Instead, they are framed as threats—harmful actors who should be punished, excluded, or dismissed.
This dynamic is well known in many areas of research, but under different names. Scholars in fields such as moral psychology, criminology, and dehumanization studies have shown how societies withdraw empathy from people labeled “offenders,” “extremists,” or “wrongdoers.” These discussions describe how moral judgment can turn people into outsiders whose motives are flattened and whose humanity is ignored. Yet these fields generally do not use the word “othering” for this process. As a result, this moralized form of distancing is not usually recognized within the frameworks that focus on marginalized groups.
This absence raises an important question: Why is othering explicitly recognized as harmful only when it targets certain kinds of people?
3. Introducing the Idea of the “Bad Other”
To describe this missing category, we can use the term the “bad other.” It refers to people who are treated as fundamentally different not because they are marginalized, but because they are seen as morally wrong.
Examples include:
- people with extreme political views
- people accused of causing harm
- people whose actions violate shared norms
- people who behave in ways that others find frightening, irresponsible, or cruel
The process is similar to classic othering:
- complexity is reduced
- one story replaces many
- empathy is withdrawn
- the person is treated as fundamentally different from “people like us”
4. Why This Matters
In much of the scholarship that examines othering, empathy toward the marginalized other is seen as not only possible but necessary. The idea is that if we learn to see the humanity of those who have been pushed aside, we can begin to correct some of the damage created by social hierarchies.
But when people are labeled “bad,” empathy is often actively discouraged. In many conversations—public and private—trying to understand the behavior of someone seen as harmful is interpreted as excusing that behavior. This creates a sharp divide:
Marginalized other > empathy, context, complexity
Bad other > moral judgment, distance, exclusion
This double standard has several consequences:
- It can reinforce the belief that some people are fully human and others are not.
- It deepens polarization, because each side in a conflict tends to see the other as the “bad” one.
- It makes it difficult to address the causes of harmful behavior, because understanding is confused with approval.
- It prevents us from seeing the ways in which we all, at times, behave in ways that others might judge harshly.
5. Positioning the Concept within Existing Thinking
Several fields address parts of this dynamic, but none fully capture it.
- Moral psychology shows how people divide the world into good and bad actors and how moral judgments simplify complex behavior. But it rarely connects these processes to the concept of othering as used in critical theory.
- Restorative justice encourages empathy toward those who have caused harm, but it is mostly applied in institutional settings and is not often discussed as a broader cultural pattern.
- Conflict studies examine how groups dehumanize enemies, yet this work typically focuses on extreme situations such as war or mass violence.
- Critical theory analyzes structural domination but often relies on categories such as oppressed and oppressor, which can produce sharp moral binaries—the very binaries that the idea of the “bad other” invites us to question.
The concept of the “bad other” helps connect these areas. It shows that the same mental patterns used to dehumanize marginalized groups also shape how societies respond to people whose behavior is judged harshly. Naming this pattern creates space to examine it, question it, and understand its effects.
6. What the New Concept Makes Possible
Recognizing the “bad other” does not mean denying harm or ignoring responsibility. It does not require treating all actions as equal or refusing to make moral judgments. Rather, it suggests that even when we judge behavior, we should be aware of the mental process behind the judgment.
Naming this form of othering allows us to:
- see how moral binaries simplify complex situations
- question the idea that empathy is only for certain groups
- examine how people distance themselves from those whose actions make them uncomfortable
- better understand how conflicts escalate and become stuck
- explore approaches that combine accountability with recognition of shared humanity