Agency, Constraint, and Sartre’s Idea of Bad Faith
*last updated on October 28, 2026
In this essay I want to discuss Jean-Paul Sartre’s idea of bad faith as it relates to my understanding of agency and power.
In his early existentialist work, Sartre’s concept of bad faith describes forms of self-deception in which people misrepresent their own freedom and situation to themselves. We say: “I had no choice.” “That is just who I am.” “This is simply what people like me do.” “The circumstances made me do it.” For Sartre, such explanations can become ways of escaping an uncomfortable truth: our circumstances do not simply exhaust what we are. Even refusing to choose is itself a choice, and we remain responsible for how we take up our situation.
At first, this emphasis on freedom and responsibility can seem quite far from my own starting point. Much of my work on power begins not with freedom but with constraint. We are shaped by biology, upbringing, emotion, habit, language, culture, institutions, relationships, and meanings we did not invent for ourselves. We also understand ourselves only partially: we may not recognize our motives, notice the patterns guiding our reactions, or see alternatives that appear obvious from the outside. Taking these constraints seriously encourages compassion and humility about how much control human beings actually have over their actions.
But an emphasis on constraint creates a problem of its own. If everything we do emerges from conditions we did not choose, where does responsibility go? Does understanding why someone acted as they did eventually turn into saying that they could not have done anything differently?
This is precisely the conclusion I do not want to reach. Elsewhere, I have described agency as a kind of “wiggle room”: a shifting space for movement inside constraints. Our possibilities may be drastically limited by forces we do not control without necessarily being reduced to zero. Constraint can make agency difficult to recognize and exercise without eliminating it altogether.
Seen this way, my position and Sartre’s are less opposed than they initially appeared to me. Sartre is famous for placing extraordinary weight on human freedom; I place extraordinary weight on the forces that limit it. Yet Sartre does not imagine human beings floating free of history, bodies, circumstances, or previous choices. His concept of facticity refers to the given features of our situation—our past, body, and social and historical circumstances—that we do not simply choose. However, for Sartre, these givens do not abolish the ontological freedom of consciousness. Bad faith can involve denying either side of this tension: treating ourselves as wholly determined by facticity or acting as though facticity did not matter.
The difference, then, lies partly in emphasis. Sartre begins from freedom and makes it difficult to use circumstances as a complete explanation for our actions. I begin from constraint and resist talking about responsibility as though people were autonomous choosers standing outside biology, history, and culture. Putting these perspectives together raises a question that interests me more than deciding which side of the freedom-versus-constraint debate is correct: What does responsibility look like when agency is real but uneven, situated, and sometimes extremely difficult to access?
This question connects directly to my understanding of power. I do not treat power simply as something people possess in greater or lesser amounts. A person can be powerful in one respect and deeply constrained in another. Someone may have authority, money, influence, status, a large audience, or the ability to impose consequences on others. Certainly such capacities matter. But even an action that looks like a straightforward exercise of free will can raise another question: where did that will come from?
A king may issue a decree or make a decision that profoundly affects thousands of people. From one perspective, this is an obvious expression of power: he can translate a desire into consequences for others. But the desire itself may grow out of fear, insecurity, anger, a need for recognition, inherited ideas about what a ruler should be, or patterns of thought and emotion that he barely understands and has difficulty interrupting. His capacity to impose a decision on others can therefore coexist with significant constraints on his capacity to understand or redirect the forces producing that decision. What looks like power from one angle may reveal powerlessness from another.
The reverse is also true. Someone who appears relatively powerless may retain some agency within conditions they cannot change. They may sometimes be able to alter one response, resist one interpretation, ask for help, refuse one demand, or interrupt one pattern. This is one reason I describe power and powerlessness as intertwined rather than as opposite conditions possessed by different kinds of people. We can influence others while being constrained ourselves. We can reproduce conditions we did not create. We can act from meanings we inherited rather than invented while still participating in keeping those meanings alive.
This is where Sartre’s idea of bad faith becomes especially useful to me. An account that begins with constraint always carries the risk that explanation will slide into inevitability. “I react this way because of my childhood.” “I cannot change because this is my personality.” “Everybody around me behaves like this.” “The system made me do it.” Such statements may identify genuine constraints. But they can also become stories that close the very opening through which change might occur.
A Sartrean question I want to carry into my own framework is therefore whether an explanation of why I act as I do has become a way of declaring my own agency nonexistent. Taking constraints seriously should not require treating patterns as unchangeable. If I tell myself that I am entirely produced by my history, personality, culture, or circumstances, I may fail to notice the ways in which I participate in reproducing what constrains me.
Where I become much more cautious is when the same logic travels from self-examination into judgment of another person. From the outside, it is easy to say: “You had a choice.” “You knew what you were doing.” “You could have acted differently.” “Stop making excuses.” But an observer sees the action without fully seeing the internal terrain from which it emerged. I cannot inhabit another person’s nervous system, history, fear, attention, habits, meanings, or degree of self-understanding at the moment when a decision was made. I may identify alternatives that appear obvious to me without knowing how available those alternatives were from inside that person’s experience. What looks like a wide opening from where I stand may have looked like a crack from inside the situation.
This limitation does not require abandoning accountability. I can identify harm, protect myself or somebody else, set boundaries, support consequences, ask for repair, or encourage someone to examine where they might have acted differently. What I cannot do with the same confidence is move from “this action caused harm” to “I know exactly how free you were when you chose it.” Responsibility does not require psychological omniscience.
This leaves me with an asymmetry that helps clarify what I want to take from Sartre. When I turn toward myself, I can ask: “Am I telling myself that I have no choice when some possibility of acting differently remains? Am I hiding behind a role, a habit, a story about my personality, or a description of circumstances because acknowledging the possibility of change would be uncomfortable?” But when I turn toward another person, a different question becomes necessary: “What constraints might I not be seeing?” The first question keeps explanation from hardening into inevitability. The second keeps accountability from hardening into certainty about another person’s freedom.